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Theories of psychological energy have a rich history going back to the beginning
of the field of psychology, employing concepts such as "libido," "psychic energy,"
"orgone energy," "bioenergetics," "psycho-energetics," "life energy," "organizing field,"
and "living-matrix." There has been a recent effort to find neural correlates with these
concepts, but these data may not capture the fullness of the phenomenon. Because
psychological energy is an elusive concept with many interpretations, research into
this phenomenon faces the most basic questions regarding where and how to start.
To address these questions, this paper explores several theories of ontology that could
apply to psychological energy in the ways that major theorists have described it: the
metaphysical foundationalist ontologies of Alfred North Whitehead, Ken Wilber, and
Roy Bhaskar; the existentialist ontologies of Martin Heidegger and Maurice MerleauPonty; and extensions of existentialist ontology from Eugene Gendlin and Jorge N.
Ferrer. It is argued that epistemological approaches based on existentialist ontology
offer a more fruitful starting point for developing research methods in the study
of psychological energy than methods grounded in metaphysical foundationalist
ontologies. Grounds for ontological and epistemological dialog between these
perspectives are explored
Keywords: psychological energy, libido, orgone, biofield, psycho-energetics, ontology,
epistemology, Whitehead, Wilber, Bhaskar, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gendlin, Ferrer

S

ince William James and Pierre Janet in the 19th
century, psychologists have used variations
of the term “energy” to describe the dynamic
forces at work within the psyche and the soma
and the psychotherapeutic processes of change
(Wehowsky, 2015). Variations on these terms over
time have included “libido” (e.g., Freud, 2012a/1920,
2012b/1899, 2012c/1922; Jung, 2014/1969), “psychic
energy” (e.g., Jung, 2014/1969), “orgone energy”
(e.g., Reich, 1968/1942), “bioenergetics” (e.g.,
Lowen, 1979/1958), “psycho-energetics” (Assagioli,
1973, as cited in Rosselli & Vanni, 2014), “life energy”
(Levine & Frederick, 1997), “organizing field”
(Feinstein, 2012b), and “living-matrix” (Wehowsky,
2015). A relatively sparse body of data supports the
efficacy of using such concepts in a clinical setting
(cf. Bloch-Atefi & Smith, 2014; Feinstein, 2012a;
Röhricht, 2009; Ventling, 2002). Part of the reason

for the paucity of data in this field is the difficulty
demonstrating both the ontological nature of such
hypothesized energies, as well as measuring them
(e.g., Hufford et al., 2015; Tiller, 2010). Given that
measurement is elusive, and that the ontological
nature of psychological energy is in question, this
paper attempts to get at the root of the problem by
starting with the basic question of ontology itself
to evaluate what might be the most productive
epistemological approaches for exploring the
possible nature of psychological energy—a term
which, in this paper, broadly refers to any energyoriented concept used in the theory and practice
of psychology, such as libido, orgone energy, lifematrix, and so on. It is argued that epistemological
approaches based on existentialist ontology offer a
more fruitful starting point for developing research
methods for the study of psychological energy than
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methods grounded in metaphysical foundationalist
ontologies.
Psychological energy is far from the
predominant explanatory framework for process
and change in 21st-century psychology and
psychotherapy.
However,
descriptions
that
employ the frame of psychological energy retain
a connection to phenomenal experiences of both
therapist and client in psychotherapy. A review
of early 20th-century theorists of psychological
energy (Da, in press) concluded that qualities of this
energy were associated with emotional states, the
ability to accomplish tasks, and experiences related
to directionality or movement, such as inward,
outward, upward, or downward. Jung (2014/1969),
for example, saw depressed mood as an introverted
energy and positive mood as an extraverted energy,
which might be reflected in the eye position of a
psychotherapy client: A depressed client may look
down toward their feet or lap and feel a sense of
impending doom whereas a client who has just
experienced a personal success, such as a job
promotion, might look out toward the sky as if seeing
a world of possibilities. Linguistic, conceptual, and
theoretical frames oriented toward psychological
energy may point to underlying aspects of behaviors,
cognitive events, or somatic experiences within
both the client and therapist that other explanatory
frames do not currently encompass. An richer, more
comprehensive understanding of psychological
phenomena may prove more accessible, meaningful,
and satisfying to both the client and therapist, and it
may help guide the application and interpretation of
neuroscientific measurement.
A Brief Review of Psychological Energy
he history of theory and concepts related to
energy in psychology can be viewed as a tree.
Its roots are in the work of the groundbreaking
contemporaries of Sigmund Freud—namely
William James and Pierre Janet—whose theories of
psychological energy had less direct impact than
Freud’s, but whose theories Freud reacted against.
Freud’s work provided the primary directionality
for the trunk of the tree; this trunk comprises the
work of major theorists from the psychoanalytic, or
depth psychology, tradition. Subsequent analytical
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theories of psychological energy included Carl Jung
(e.g., 2014b/1969), Wilhelm Reich (e.g., 1968/1942),
Alexander Lowen (e.g., 1979/1958), and Roberto
Assagioli (1973, 1974). For the purposes of this paper,
I have grouped these early theorists into a category
referred to as the “analytical tradition.” This term
is somewhat imprecise because James and Janet
were not analytical psychiatrists within the depth
psychology tradition, but their work was influential
for the analysts. The analytical theorists (inclucing
James and Janet) conceptualized psychological
energy in ways that persist to this day. However,
major differences in theoretical perspectives
elucidated by these early theorists also persist in
modern psychology.
Following Lowen’s work in the mid-1970s,
the tree forked into two main branches. One branch
was led by John Pierrakos (1990), a colleague of
Lowen’s who felt that Lowen had abandoned the
energetic essence of Reich’s work. This branch
eventually led to modern biofield-based theories
and techniques in psychotherapy, such as emotional
freedom technique (EFT; Church, 2017). I refer to
this category of theories as “neo-Reichian,” and
two distinctions are relevant for this categorization.
First, the term neo-Reichian is used in different
ways by different authors. Some use this term to
refer specifically to therapies derived from Reich’s
work, focusing either on its analytical or bodycentered components (e.g., Geuter, 2015); others
use this term to refer to body psychotherapy in
general or any type of body psychotherapy that is
not within the gestalt therapy tradition (e.g., Mindell,
1981). Herein, neo-Reichian refers to psychological
theories and techniques that use “energy” and
related concepts in ways that are specifically either
spiritually-oriented or grounded in biofield theory.
The reasons for this categorization are that (a) both
these groups of theories have tended to reject the
primacy of the Western anatomical model as a
framework for psychological energy in a way that
is similar to Reich; and (b) biofield theory includes
some perspectives that are grounded in spirituality,
rather than physics, but not all spiritually-oriented
perspectives also self-identify as biofield-oriented.
Second, it is worth noting that even though Assagioli
is included in the analytic tradition in this paper,
Da & Hartelius

his work was also influential for the neo-Reichians.
However, this was due to later theorists recognizing
the overlap between the work of Assagioli and
Reich, rather than a linear relationship. Assagioli had
a linear relationship with Freud, but developed his
theories in parallel with Reich and Jung (Assagioli,
1974b).
The other branch influenced by Lowen was
the somatic trauma therapies, which is referred to
herein as the bio-somatic tradition. “Bio-somatic”
is a practical neologism because there does not
appear to be another term for this distinction in the
literature. The bio-somatic lineage was initiated by
Peter Levine (e.g., Levine, 2012; Levine & Frederick,
1997). Rather than focusing on so-called subtle
energy, as the neo-Reichians did, bio-somatic
therapists have emphasized energy as located within
the biophysical body as conceptualized by Western
allopathic medicine, primarily the nervous system.
Empiricism, Ontology,
and Psychological Energy
he empirical study of psychology is grounded
in a philosophy of science that Teo (2018)
characterized as “naïve empiricism” (p. 158), which
aims to set aside preconceived theories, concepts,
and biases in order to draw conclusions based on
empirical observation. This version of empiricism is
derived, in short, through the philosophical lineage
of David Hume (2000/1739), whose commitment
to empirical observation rejected the necessity
for ontological models, arguing that observation
demonstrated the nature of the universe and that
philosophical ontology basically amounted to
speculation. The empiricist belief in the importance
of observation, in turn, runs through the work
of Descartes (1999) and Kant (2021/1781), who
essentially argued, albeit in different ways, that
a subjective observation is irrevocably separated
from its object; descriptions of observations are the
closest one can get to so-called true knowledge.
While this is explicitly more of an epistemological
rather than ontological position, Bhaskar (1997/1975)
argued that an empiricist stance, such as the one
typical in psychological research, merely obscures
ontological assumptions about the nature of the
universe that would enable empirical observation
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to begin with, much less give these observations a
place of epistemological primacy:
The sense in which every account of science
presupposes an ontology is the sense in which
it presupposes a schematic answer to the question of what the world must be like for science
to be possible. (p. 59)
Bhaskar’s explication of these ontological
assumptions is reviewed below; for now, some overall
epistemological critiques of the naïve empiricist
perspective are relevant to the study of psychological
energy. As Hartelius (2019) noted, these biases are
often informed—and perhaps blinded—by implicit
Western cultural assumptions about reality. This
means, for example, that visual information and visual
modeling is generally preferred over other sensory
information, such as information that comes from
feelings within the human body (Hartelius, 2007,
2019; Levin, 1993). To extend the visual metaphor,
much that occurs under empirical observation
may be overlooked owing to the culture-bound
limitations of the experimental design. These types of
Western cultural biases tend to tightly couple naïve
empiricism with what Morassaie and Hosseini (in
press) have called “classical physicalism,” or what is
more commonly referred to as “materialism,” which
is grounded in Newtonian physics and considers
metaphysics to be all those principles and phenomena
that lie outside the scope of classical physics. The
classical physicalist perspective is commonly—often
implicitly—applied to quantum physics, as well as
classical physics (Morassaie & Hosseini, in press).
Many theorists of psychological energy, particularly
in the last 25 years, have defaulted to classical
physicalist explanations for psychological energy.
For example, in his earlier work on the treatment
of trauma, Peter Levine (Levine & Frederick, 1997)
frequently referred to somewhat nebulous terms such
as “energy” and “vitality.” However, in his later work,
Levine (2012) relied almost exclusively on Western
medical explanations for energetic experiences,
largely grounded in Porges’s (2001) theory regarding
the relationship between the polyvagal nerve
complex and emotions.
A classical physicalist stance is likely the
easiest path to cultural acceptance for a theory
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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or idea in the modern cultural climate. However,
physicalism has been expanded beyond classical
physicalism. Ney (2018) identified at least two
variations on physicalism that could easily include
psychological energy in a way that is not limited by
the current constraints of physical measurement:
“Futurism” holds that all phenomena can be
hypothetically explained by physics, but current
physics simply may not yet have discovered the
mechanisms that would explain them; and theories
that, a priori, reject both physicalism’s reliance
on physics and the so-called mentality constraint,
holding that all phenomena, including mental
phenomena, are by definition physical, and thus
no conflict exists between accepting as physical
phenomena that are currently mathematically
explained by physics and phenomena that are not.
(For a further review of alternatives to classical
physicalism, see Morassaie & Hosseini, in press.)
These perspectives allow a physicalist point of
view while recognizing that current techniques of
observation, measurement, and calculation are not
adequate to capture all phenomena. This could
include such phenomena as psychological energy.
Two categories of ontological argument
since the early 20th century that challenge the
Cartesian and Kantian so-called philosophies of
reflection might support concepts of psychological
energy: metaphysical foundationalist ontologies, in
which the essential nature of reality is understood as
an object of induction, typified by the work of Alfred
North Whitehead (2014/1948); and existentialist
ontologies, typified by the work of Martin Heidegger
(1999/1927). These theories are not incompatible
with the range of conventional Western empiricist
positions, including naïve empiricism. Metaphysical
foundationalism is a subcategory of monistic
philosophy that rests on the assumptions that (a)
things within the world are dependent upon the
existence of the world as a whole; and (b) the
existence of the world as a whole is dependent upon
a fundamental metaphysical principle (Schaffer,
2010). This metaphysical principle is necessarily
outside the scope of empirical observation because
it requires stepping outside the world to observe
it; thus it lies within the domain of theory, and
it is treated as an inductive theoretical object.
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Metaphysical foundationalism goes back at least
to Plato, but this paper is concerned with a few of
its post-twentieth-century variations. Existentialist
ontologies focus on human situatedness in, and
relationship to, the world. The existentialists keep
their inferences and inductions about the nature of
reality close to that relationship as it occurs through
direct or mediated human experience. At the same
time, the existentialists take a broadly human,
relational stance toward empirical epistemology
that includes ways of knowing beyond merely the
five human senses or sensory information enhanced
through observational instruments.
Both metaphysical foundationalist and
existentialist ontologies attempt to open up
possibilities within the field of human understanding,
which might in turn open avenues of understanding
to the phenomenon of psychological energy. This
paper presents a comparative survey of several
ontological theories that have been influential in the
theory and practice of psychological energy or have
the potential to influence its study. The summary of
each theory is necessarily brief in order to distill the
aspects that may be most relevant to future research
on psychological energy. This paper is an attempt to
sift through these competing ontological frameworks
in order to determine the most productive starting
points for research into psychological energy.
Metaphysical Foundationalist Ontology
ntil the 20th century, metaphysical foundationalism was effectively the default position in
Western philosophy (cf. Bennett, 2011; Cameron,
2008). Within this philosophical tradition, three
20th- and 21st-century philosophers espoused
ontologies that seem particularly congruent with
theories of psychological energy: Alfred North
Whitehead, Ken Wilber, and Roy Baskar. Owing to
the respective hierarchies within these ontologies,
they all allow that phenomena can exist within
the world that are beyond the purview of ordinary
human sense experience and instruments of
scientific measurement. Indeed, most major
theorists who have attempted to explain the nature of
psychological energy have relied on some variation
of metaphysical foundationalism—a point that is
discussed further in relation to each ontologist. This
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section reviews the metaphysical foundationalist
ontologies of Whitehead, Wilber, and Baskar with
an emphasis on their relevance for the study of
psychological energy.
Whitehead: Eternal Objects,
Concrescence, and Actual Occasions
An accomplished physicist and mathematician, Alfred North Whitehead (1967/1933, 2010/1929,
2014/1948) developed a process-oriented philosophy
of physics and metaphysics to address axiological
concerns, such as ethics and aesthetics. Whitehead’s
central question was twofold: Why do objects in
the universe tend to relate to one another, rather
than drifting apart into deadness; and given that
physics does not explain axiological concerns,
such as aesthetics and ethics, how can these be
explained without violating the laws of physics?
According to Whitehead (2010/1929), there must
be a metaphysical force, which he referred to
as “God,” from which a diffusion of potentiality
concresces into actual phenomena. Whitehead’s
theory can be seen as congruent with some theories
of psychological energy, particularly those of James
(2004/1902), Janet (cf. Craparo et al., 2019), Jung
(2014/1969), and Reich (1968/1942).
Eternal objects are absolute potentials that
do not change; “there are no novel eternal objects,”
according to Whitehead (2010/1929, p. 22).
Statements or experiences of value, such as beauty or
ethics, are evaluations of the closeness or alignment
of an experience with one or more eternal objects.
For example, saying that a natural setting, such as a
mountain vista, is beautiful is to say that it reflects an
eternal sense of order—order that is infused into the
setting through the penetration of eternal objects.
When observing the scene of a garbage dump, a
haphazard mix of industrial and biological refuse,
eternal objects are relatively obscured. This principle
might be extrapolated in psychology to suggest that
mentally and emotionally expansive experiences,
such as those associated with love or contentment,
are closely aligned with eternal objects; in mentally
and emotionally contracted experiences, such as
those associated with anxiety or shame, eternal
objects are relatively obscured.
Eternal objects influence the concrescence
of “actual occasions” or “actual entities,” which are
Ontologies for Research on Psychological Energy

the things that happen in the world: “[The] actual
world is a process, and that the process is the
becoming of actual entities” (Whitehead, 2010/1929,
p. 22). While eternal objects are unchanging,
pure potential, actual entities are always specific,
temporal, and bound to an environment. Actual
entities are “drops of experience” (Whitehead,
2010/1929, p. 18) that are inherently and indivisibly
experiential; their experiential quality is felt. This
feeling includes “the Objective datum” (what is
felt), as well as the “subjective form” (how it is
felt) (Whitehead, 2010/1929, p. 221). The process
of the becoming of actual entities is a constant
concrescence, or recombination, of actual entities
into novel experiences. According to Whitehead
(2010/1929), this “advance into novelty” (p. 222)
would not be possible without the influence of
eternal objects, which are, in turn, the emanations
of God:
Apart from the intervention of God, there could
be nothing new in the world, and no order in
the world. The course of creation would be a
dead level of ineffectiveness, with all balance
and intensity progressively excluded by the
cross currents of incompatibility. The novel hybrid feelings derived from God, with the derivative sympathetic conceptual valuations, are the
foundations of progress. (p. 247)
Whitehead took this argument further. The
infusion of eternal objects does not merely rely on
God, such that the world is created in God’s image.
Rather, all actual entities are infused with their own
creative impulses owing to their entanglement with
eternal objects. This continual concrescence creates
novel entities that are distinct from one another, and
from God:
The creativity [of actual entities] is not an external agency with its own ulterior purposes. All
actual entities share with God this characteristic
of self-causation. For this reason every actual
entity also shares with God the characteristic of
transcending all other actual entities, including
God. The universe is thus a creative advance
into novelty. (Whitehead, 2010/1929, p. 222,
emphasis added)
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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This creative impulse moves toward the
“satisfaction” of the concrescence, which results
in a “complex unity of feeling” (Whitehead,
2010/1929, p. 220. There are two key points here:
(a) The satisfaction of concrescence results in a
complex feeling, and (b) concrescence is always in
the process of advance into novelty. Even though
an actual occasion is “fully determinant” in its
feeling (Whitehead, 2010/1929, p. 25), it is not static
and fixed. Further, the feeling is not necessarily
measurable, even though the actual occasion does
have an objective aspect.
Even though clear scientific evidence for
psychological energy is lacking, it is not precluded
as an actual occasion in Whitehead’s framework.
Indeed, theories of psychological energy, such as
Freud’s libido, attempt to describe feelings, categories
of feelings, and processes related to these feelings.
For Freud (2012a/1920, 2012b/1899, 2012c/1922),
these feelings were largely related to sexual desire
and satisfaction.
One possible explanation for the experience
of psychological energy is that it is a type of
actual occasion—a fully determinant feeling—
that is outside the bounds of current physical
measurement. James (2004/1902), Janet (cf. Craparo
et al., 2019), Jung (2014/1969), and Reich (1968/1942)
all proposed theories along these lines. Jung and
Reich, for example, associated psychological energy
with concepts in various Indigenous traditions that
described energy as a medium of transfer between
human will and physical matter. Janet believed that
psychological energy was an entity that might be
measurable with appropriate, hypothetical apparati,
but it was not energy or matter that was known to the
physical sciences. James saw psychological energy
as a medium between the divine will and physical
form. Any of these explanations could hypothetically
be mapped onto Whitehead’s ontology as one or
more types of “contrasts.” Contrasts are “patterns
of entitites” (Whitehead, 2010/1929, p. 22) that
can form an indefinite number of combinations.
Defining psychological energy as a contrast, in
Whitehead’s terms, does not clarify its nature. It
simply allows it to exist within his ontological model
as some combination, or pattern, of actual entities
and eternal objects.
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Other possible “categories of existence,”
as Whitehead (2010/1929) called types of entities,
for psychological energy are “subjective forms”
(private experiences, or private matters of fact) and
“propositions” (theories). Private, intrasubjective
experiences are at least partially composed of
neuronal events. If psychological energy is simply
a subjective experience or an interpretation of
an experience, it is still real, or “actual,” within
Whitehead’s framework. A number of authors (e.g.,
Bieber, 1958; Hufford et al., 2015; Wallerstein,
1977) have suggested that psychological energy
is merely a theory—and perhaps a misguided
one at that. Even if this is true, Whitehead argued
that theories are complex relationships between
actual entities and a complex eternal object
that represents the potentials that determine the
tendencies of future actual occurrences.
Whitehead’s categories of subjective forms
and propositions allow psychological energy to exist
within his ontological framework, but the notion
that subjective experiences and theories actually
exist is not particularly revelatory. More apropos
to many of the major theorists of psychological
energy is Whitehead’s explanation regarding the
entanglement of eternal objects—the qualities of
God—and actual entities, which map more closely
to what is traditionally regarded as the “material.”
The scientific problem is self-evident: In order
to understand it, such a conception relies on an
appeal to God, or at least a creative, non-material,
divine source with qualities that are specific, but
not directly observable. Whitehead’s ontology is
explicitly metaphysical, which makes it difficult to
situate within psychological science. Whitehead’s
theory of metaphysics and ontology dovetails
with some psychological theorists’—particularly
Jung’s, Reich’s, and James’s—explanations of
psychological energy as a phenomenon that is not
metaphysical, but is aligned with, or originating
from, a metaphysical source. That is, when
psychological energy is the most powerfully felt,
the feeling is axiologically satisfying, which in
Whitehead’s view, indicates an actual occasion in
which eternal objects are relatively unobscured.
Nonetheless, an explanation along these lines
presents challenges to empirical validation that are
Da & Hartelius

untenable unless one first agrees to Whitehead’s
metaphysical premises.
Wilber: Hierarchical Ontology
with a Creative, Metaphysical Source
Ken Wilber (e.g., 2000, 2001, 2006, 2007,
2011) was the predominant thinker in transpersonal
psychology in the 1980s and 1990s, and he explicitly
fitted psychological energy into an ontological
scheme. Wilber (2000) alternately described
psychological energy (using libido as an example)
in two main ways: (a) as one of nine “sheaths” or
“fulcrums” of self-development, generally related to
emotion; and (b) part of the “subtle” realm of being,
realms which also include “gross” and “causal.”
Gross is the physical realm; causal is the realm of the
unmanifest; subtle is a spectrum between these two,
which includes psychological phenomena, such
as emotions and dreams, as well as a broad range
of phenomena that are not easily explained within
the natural sciences, such as telepathy and other
transpersonal experiences, and so-called subtle
energies, such as prana or qi.
Wilber (2006) later evolved his theories
on some of these points, but the nuances are not
important for this discussion. What is important about
Wilber’s overall theory is that reality is grounded in
a nondual, undifferentiated source, and it becomes
more differentiated as it concresces—or, in his words,
moves up the great chain, or nest, of being—from
causal to subtle to gross. Wilber (2000) made a direct
association between his description of this process
with the ways that entities concresce into complexity
and novelty according to Whitehead (2010/1929).
Wilber added that subtle phenomena, such as
psychological energy, are those that are perceptible
from the perspective of states of consciousness
associated with the phenomena, but not by sensory
awareness that is attuned to an ordinary, waking state
of consciousness or the gross level of being. Wilber
(2011) further argued that information received in
such states can be confirmed or rejected by other
people who have trained or otherwise achieved a
similar state. He called such knowledge vetters a
“community of the adequate” (p. 326). Wilber (2011)
used the example of learning zazen mediation to
illustrate that one must follow the steps of the process
to gain access to each new insight to state-based
Ontologies for Research on Psychological Energy

information from the perspective, or altitude, of the
relevant state: “A person must be developmentally
adequate to [the] disclosure or there is, in fact, no
disclosure, just as if you never learn to read you will
never grasp Macbeth” (p. 55).
Regarding psychological energy, as well as
other phenomena within transpersonal psychology,
it is tempting to adopt Wilber’s theory because
he explicitly plots such phenoema into a broad,
cohesive framework. Because of the parallels with
Whitehead’s theory of concrescence, Wilber’s
theory about the nature of psychological energy
and similar phenomena tends to lend support for the
theories of James (2004/1902), Janet (cf. Craparo et
al., 2019), Jung (2014/1969), and Reich (1968/1942).
However, the scientific problem is also similar to
that of Whitehead’s theory: In order to adopt it, one
must accept Wilber’s principle that there is a divine,
nondual, creative source from which all other
phenomena emanate. Wilber (2011) countered this
critique by arguing that one must have a confirming,
transcendent experience in order to see the truth of
this pillar of his theoretical stance—his “community
of the adequate.” Nonetheless, two glaring problems
remain with this position. First, one must grant
that people who have had the experiences Wilber
described are correct in their ultimate assessment of
the nature of reality, and further that they all agree,
which is far from clear (Ferrer, 2002, 2011; Hartelius
& Ferrer, 2013). Second, people who have not had
such experiences are required to take it on faith that
these authority figures are correct (Ferrer, 2002;
Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013).
Whether Wilber’s ontological theory is
correct, it does potentially point toward a valuable
avenue of research. Wilber (2006) argued that one
must be in the proper state of consciousness in
order to experience a phenomenon; and further,
to achieve the proper state of consciousness often
requires a developmental practice (Wilber, 2011).
Along these lines, an experimenter effect has long
been theorized that may influence research in
parapsychology: Researchers who are advocates of
psi phenomena and may believe themselves to have
psi abilities are more likely to conduct experiments
that yield positive results (Schlitz et al., 2006; Smith,
2003). While there are multiple interpretations of
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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this apparent experimenter effect, including mistake
and fraud, pro-psi researchers tend to favor the idea
that their positive attitudes and psi abilities create
more favorable conditions for the observation of psi
phenomena (Smith, 2003). A series of collaborative
studies on the feeling of being watched (Wiseman
& Schlitz, 1997, 1999) seem to support the latter
hypothesis: Wiseman, a skeptic, obtained chance
results, while Schlitz, who is pro-psi, obtained
statistically positive results; both researchers used
the same research design, equipment, and data
analysis procedures. If such experimenter effects are
due to the attitudes and abilities of the researchers,
perhaps any observational studies on psychological
energy might best be conducted by experts who
are able to be in a state of consciousness in which
these phenomena occur, in order that they may be
observed; and the ability to achieve such a state of
consciousness may require appropriate training. This
point is further developed in the Discussion.
Bhaskar: Nested Ontological Domains
in the Philosophy of Science
Roy Bhaskar (1997/1975) founded the
philosophy of critical realism as a response to a
debate in the mid-1970s between positivist and neoKantian philosophers of science on one side, and
postmodernist views typified by the work of Rorty
(1979). Bhaskar (2016) used a theory of ontology
to explicate the philosophical assumptions across
these opposing views in the philosophy of science
in order to “philosophically underlabour for science
and practices oriented to human well-being” (p.
1). Bhaskar (1997/1975) described three nested
ontological domains in the natural sciences:
•

•
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The domain of the “empirical” represents what
is observed, either through sense experience or
instrumentation. In psychology, one example is
the neuroimaging data from an fMRI machine.
The domain of the “actual” represents all of the
transitive processes or events that actually occur,
or potentially actually occur, in time and space,
regardless of whether they are empirically observed. An example would be all the things that
happened in the universe at the same time that
an fMRI image was taken, whether or not they
were captured in the image.
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

•

The domain of the “real” includes all of the processes or events that occur in the “actual” and
“empirical” domains, plus the intransitive laws,
causes, or underlying structures that enable the
actual events to occur. In the fMRI example, the
“real” represents the underlying, stable structures that enable the fMRI machine to operate.
These could be laws of physics, such as Faraday’s law of induction, or possibly even metaphysical principles, such as the will of God.

The “empirical” is the domain of observation,
and the “real” is the domain of theory. Between
these two lies the truth of what the world is “actually”
like.
Bhaskar’s critical realist ontology allows
that psychological energy is a phenomenon that
actually occurs in nature, but simply has not been
empirically observed in science owing to the
strictures of and assumptions regarding scientific
observation. At a basic level, critical realism would
prescribe expanding the scope and capacity
of empirical observation, such as developing
new observational instruments and techniques.
However, critical realism offers a host of other tools
and techniques for researching difficult to observe
phenomena, such as psychological energy.
This nested ontological model applies first
and foremost to the natural sciences (Bhaskar,
1997/1975). As such, it most obviously applies
to the biological components of psychology,
such as neurocognitive psychology and
psychopharmacology. It posits that there is
something “real” and “intransitive” underlying
natural phenomena, and by extension, those
aspects of psychology that emerge from biology.
Thus, these phenomena cannot be reduced to
logical or linguistic constructs. However, the
tools of social constructionism can be used to
critique the conclusions derived from empirical
observation, especially their purportedly neutral
and objective nature, and thus enrich scientists’
understanding of the world as it actually is.
Knowledge is a “produced means of production”
(Bhaskar, 2014/1979, p. 14), and it is valuable to
critique the ways in which knowledge is produced.
That is, in part, the purpose of this paper.
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Further, Bhaskar (2014/1979; Bhaskar et
al., 2017) advocated for multidisciplinary research
in which research methods were conducted
at the appropriate “ontological level.” In this
approach, the definitions of causes (the “real”),
events (the “actual”), and descriptive regularities
(the “empirical”) are adjusted in scope, scale,
and contextual emphasis, depending upon the
phenomenon in which a researcher is interested
(Bhaskar et al., 2017). This might mean, for example,
applying phenomenological, hermeneutical, or
other research methods, depending upon the best
method to examine the particular phenomenon.
Of the three metaphysical foundationalist
ontologies reviewed in this paper, Bhaskar’s offers
two advantages for research in psychological
energy: (a) It specifies that whatever psychological
energy may be, it represents an actual occurrence
within the natural world, and it can thus be studied
through appropriate research methods; (b) it allows
for multi-disciplinary research methods that map to
a tiered, or “laminated” ontology. As an example
of reality as a laminated system, observing a street
scene in India, one could look through the lens of
economics, linguistics, religion, epidemiology, or
civil engineering (Bhaskar, 2016; Bhaskar et al., 2017;
Collier, 1989). According to Bhaskar et al. (2017),
[Interdisciplinary researchers] should construct
a laminated system consisting in a conjunctive
multiplicity of levels or lamination of reality.
This system should not be reductionist, neither
should it be totally eclectic: it should provide a
version of reality that is contoured and differentiating. (pp. 201–202)
A map for constructing such a “contoured
and differentiating” understanding of psychological
energy, again, speaks to the purpose of this paper,
which is expanded in the Discussion. Bhaskar’s
idea of a leveled ontology offers a similar path
to allowing for the possibility of psychological
energy as Whitehead’s and Wilber’s hierarchical
ontologies. However, Bhaskar’s concept of a leveled,
striated, or laminated system may offer a more
direct and productive path toward understanding
diversity among theories and evidence regarding
psychological energy.
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Existentialist Ontology
xistentialist ontologies stand in contrast to
metaphysical foundationalism by focusing on
a human, rather than cosmic, scope and scale.
Existentialist ontologies aim to understand the
nature of reality through human subjective,
intersubjective, and relational engagement with the
world. Martin Heidegger (1999/1927) is one of the
few major theorists operating in this philosophical
framework who approached his theory explicitly as
a philosophy of ontology. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s
(1968, 2012/1945) ontology explores the human
interface with the world from a body-centered
perspective. Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty
have been influential in the development of research
methods—Heidegger in hermeneutics (Smythe et
al., 2008) and phenomenology (Macann, 1993), and
Merleau-Ponty in phenomenology (Macann, 1993).
This section reviews the ontological theories of
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. It also briefly reviews
the ways that Eugene Gendlin (1978, 2018) applied
Heidegger’s ontological concepts to psychology. Finally,
Jorge N. Ferrer’s (2002, 2017) participatory theory is
discussed. Participatory theory draws on existentialist
ontologies, but it constitutes an emergent category of
ontological theory that emphasizes participatory, cocreative relationships. It is argued that participatory
theory could provide a foundation for dialog between
existentialist and metaphysical foundationalist
ontologies in the study of psychological energy.
Heidegger: Existential Engagement
in the Disclosure of Being
Heidegger (1999/1927) focused on the
human relationship to the nature of things, which he
referred to as Dasein, in order to understand how
humans can both live within the world and their
own bodies, and yet also understand the world and
themselves as both subjects and objects. Dasein
is “disclosed” through existential engagement, or
lived experience. Heidegger (1999/1927) explained
that by “disclose” he meant “’to lay open’ and ‘the
character of being laid open,’” and specifically not
“to obtain indirectly by inference,” or similar (p. 114).
In other words, existential engagement is the path to
understanding, but understanding, while an aspect
of Dasein, is not the fullness of a phenomenon.
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Existentiality in and of itself does not
describe the essence of being in the absence of
interpretation and analysis. In this way, humans
rely on hermeneutical engagement to attempt to
understand and communicate the Dasein, or isness of a phenomenon. The Dasein of entities
(things in the world) exists in relationship. Thus,
the existentiality of entities also occurs relationally.
Heidegger (1999/1927) used the oft-cited example
of a carpenter and their hammer. The hammer
has a type of being that is called readiness-tohand (Zuhandenheit), which cannot be observed
externally, or even theorized about. It must be
existentially disclosed. The Dasein of the hammer in
hand is disclosed existentially, but the description of
the hammer in hand is hermeneutical.
Setting aside variation among theories of
psychological energy, psychotherapists have a
common lexicon of energetic phenomena. For
example, “the energy in the room” refers to a range of
experiences that might indicate a sadness, or weight,
an excitement or readiness on the part of the client,
or a “tension in the air.” Techniques for responding
to the energy in the room are an essential part of
the psychotherapist’s toolkit, similar to a carpenter’s
hammer. Like the carpenter’s hammer, the energy
in the room and the therapist’s response to it are
disclosed existentially. Therapeutic skills and theories
can be trained through hermeneutical methods of
transmission, but the reality—the Dasein—of the
moment is in a way that cannot be fully understood
through theory or training. Heidegger (1999/1927)
drew on Aristotle to argue that a discussion of the
nature of phenomena leverages both the nature of a
thing and the conversants’ understanding of it:
In discourse . . . , what is said . . . is drawn from
what the talk is about, so that discursive communication, in what it says . . . , makes manifest
what it is talking about, and thus makes this accessible to the other party. (p. 56)
Two therapists, or a therapist and a client,
can have an experience that they call “libido”
or “energy,” and exchange an understanding of
the phenomenon based on its prior existential
disclosure. The investigation and exchange of
this understanding is hermeneutical, according to
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Heidegger, even though the essence, or Dasein, lies
beyond, or beneath, this hermeneutical exchange.
Heidegger argued that science assumes
the nature of Dasein a priori, but cannot itself
demonstrate Dasein. For example, biology is a
“science of life,” but “Life, in its own right, is a
kind of Being; but essentially it is accessible only
in Dasein” (Heidegger, 1999/1927, p. 79). Likewise,
psychological energy may be a “kind of Being”
whose essence the natural sciences can only assume
or, more to the point, dismiss a priori. Following
Heidegger’s logic, this could be one of the reasons
the natural sciences have failed to affirm the
existence of psychological energy. This explanation
would at least fit with major theorists such as James
(2004/1902), Janet (cf. Craparo et al., 2019), Jung
(2014/1969), and Reich (1968/1942), who all argued
in various ways that psychological energy was of a
more subtle nature than physical phenomena, and
thus inaccessible to the tools of the natural sciences.
Trying to measure psychological energy may
not be possible through established methodologies
within the natural sciences. However, a therapist’s
engagement of energetic phenomena might be
said to be a way of engaging with the “concern”
(Besorgen; Heideger, 1999/1927, p. 89) of the
therapeutic moment. The energetic experience
is part of what is shared phenomenologically and
hermeneutically between therapist and client. By
engaging with this concern effectively (that is, from
an authentically existential stance of therapeutic
concern that is expressed through therapeutic skill),
change can be effected. Even though the Dasein of
psychological energy may not be fully understood,
its Dasein is nonetheless disclosed in such a
therapeutic encounter and may serve a therapeutic
value. Further, if the Dasein of a phenomenon
hermeneutically called psychological energy is
present in the therapeutic encounter, it is available
empirically if engaged through appropriate methods.
Heidegger employs a relational, existential
orientation toward ontology that allows that things
are in a way that humans encounter but cannot fully
logically comprehend or verbally express. It is the
attempt to understand, interpret, and communicate
the nature of Dasein where meaning is gained and lost.
When applied to psychological energy, Heidegger’s
Da & Hartelius

approach suggests that to get closer to the Dasein of the
phenomena to which a particular theorist is pointing,
one might best start through existential engagement
with the phenomena. Such engagement would best
use all faculties available to the researcher—every
sense, organ, sinew, intuition, skill, state, and mode
of being. Following such engagement, hermeneutical
understanding, communication, and interpretation
might be improved.
Gendlin: A Psychological Application
of Heidegger’s Ontology
Eugene Gendlin (1978, 2018) is the only
theorist reviewed here who does not offer a distinct
theory of ontology; his work is included as an
application of Heidegger’s ontology to the field of
psychology that might also have implications for
psychological energy. Gendlin used the concept
of the “felt sense” to describe the ways humans
know something about their state of being or mood
before it is cognitively understood. The felt sense is
“one’s feel for a wholistic texture” (Gendlin, 1978,
p. 24) of one’s state of being. Gendlin conceptually
grounded the felt sense in Heidegger’s concept of
Befindlichkeit to argue that humans have a state with
its own kind of being, knowing, and feeling before
they know what it is cognitively, or even emotionally.
Befindlichkeit is a German neologism that translates
closest to “being in a mood” (Gendlin, 1978, p. 1).
However, Gendlin (1978) distilled several specific
characteristics Heidegger ascribed to Befindlichkeit:
It is interactional with the environment, rather than
intrapsychic; it is how one finds oneself living in and
living with the world; and it has its own, implicit
understanding that occurs prior to cognition. Even
though Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit is conceptually
foundational to Gendlin’s felt sense, they are not
precisely the same concept. The felt sense might
be described as a product of Befindlichkeit that
occurs in the body and can be intrasubjectively
and holistically experienced—that is, experienced
both through the senses and through other feeling
faculties, such as a hunch.
For Gendlin (1978), the mind discovers,
or catches up, to Befindlichkeit and the felt sense.
One senses that there is a true feeling or mood
and searches to find what it is and the words to
describe it. Befindlichkeit, the felt sense, mood,
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and cognition occur in temporal sequence.
According to Heidegger (1999/1927), Befindlichkeit
“temporalizes itself primarily in having been” (p.
446). That is, human cognition and emotion always
experience themselves to be catching up to the
more fundamental, authentic, or truer condition of
Befindlichkeit. Further, Gendlin’s (2018) felt sense
comes, something like the way an emotion
comes, in the body, of its own accord, but in a
somewhat different space than the literal space
in the body. . . The space is not distinct until the
direct referent [felt sense] comes.” ("The new
kind of sequence" section).
That is, Befindlichkeit and the felt sense
are always slightly out of phase in time and space
with the physical body and the mind. They are
experienced as objects of the recent past moving
into, or being discovered in, the present, as
experienced cognitively and emotionally. This
explanatory framework, in which self-awareness is
constructed hierarchically in a spatial and temporal
progression bears some similarity to Wilber’s (2000)
perspective on the “subtle” realm of being—
the realm of psychological energy, according to
his theory—which is a phase of concrescence
preceding ordinary cognitive awareness.
The notion that the felt sense precedes
cognition and can be experienced as an object calls
to mind Reich’s (1968/1942) theory of psychological
energy, which he called “orgone,” “biological
energy,” or “vegetative sensations.” Reich theorized
that subjective perceptions—what humans see and
feel—were the results of a process that included
the “basic biological function,” by which he
meant the essential orgone life energy, the internal
organs, and the environment. Reich saw the entire
system of the human within the environment as a
“functional unit” (p. 218)—that is, the human and
the environment were not separate. Within Reich’s
thought, the character and quality of the orgone is
loosely analogous to Gendlin’s (2018) felt sense.
Reich’s subjective perceptions are loosely analogous
to Gendlin’s cognitive understanding. The mapping
of these concepts between Reich and Gendlin is not
exact, but the basic idea of a hierarchical process in
space and time is similar.
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Finally, evidence from neuropsychology
supports (a) some variation on both an experience
of the body in “a somewhat different space than the
literal space in the body,” as Gendlin (2018, “The
new kind of sequence” section) described it; and (b)
the sense of self is constructed hierarchically from
lower-order structures to higher-order structures
(Hartelius et al., 2022). While the current evidence
does not precisely align with Gendlin’s view of
the felt sense, Hartelius et al. (2022) argued that
current neuropsychological evidence demonstrates
“self-location can be experienced as extending
beyond the usual bounds of the physical body”
(p. 4)—for example, during meditation. Further,
Hartelius et al. found that changing the somatic
location of participants’ seat of attention, or sense
of self, demonstrated neural correlates with positive
emotions. While these EEG readings measured
neural wave patterns, this does seem to align
with theories of a hierarchically constructed selfexperience put forward by Gendlin, Heidegger, and
Reich. Changing a variable within this hierarchy,
such as the somatic location of the sense of self,
appears to change the experiential outcome. Reich
(1968/1942), in particular, associated orgone energy
with such practices as “the basis of every kind of
mysticism, be it Yoga, or the Fascist ‘surging of the
blood,’ or the reaction of a spiritist medium, or the
ecstasies of a dervish” (p. 217). Though current
neuropsychological data does not support the broad
span of Reich’s claims, it does seem to provide
tentative support for Reich’s conception of the selfexperience as hierarchical with a fluid or plastic
quality that can be changed by altering variables
within lower orders of the hierarchy, such as the
somatic location of attention.
Merleau-Ponty: Ontology as the
Intertwining of Subject and Object
Maruice Merleau-Ponty is primarily known
for his theory of phenomenology (2012/1945), but
he elucidated his mature theory of ontology in his
posthumously published essay, “The Intertwining—
The Chiasm” (1968). Though unfinished and
relatively brief, this essay lays out the essence of
Merleau-Ponty’s later framing of ontology as a
chiasm—a crossing over—between subject and
object. Toadvine (2019) summarized:
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Chiasm has two senses in French and English
that are both relevant to Merleau-Ponty’s project: a physiological sense that refers to anatomical or genetic structures with a crossed arrangement (such as the optic nerves), and a literary
sense referring to figures of speech that repeat
structures in reverse order (AB:BA). (n.p.)
To illustrate both these senses of a chiasm,
Merleau-Ponty (1968) used an example of seeing
the “red under my eyes” (p. 131), presumably inside
of the lower eyelid. First, to see this color to begin
with, one would need to gaze into a mirror, thus
becoming a reflexive object of their own subjective
gaze. Here subject and object are already reciprocal,
which is one meaning of the chiasm. This meaning
further harkens back to Merleau-Ponty’s (2012/1945)
earlier observation that when one touches their left
hand with their right hand, either hand can be both
subject or object, but this interchange is directional.
One hand is not both subject and object at the same
time. Rather, the experience of subject and object
are bidirectionally reversable.
The second aspect of the chiasm, the color
red under the eye, Merleau-Ponty (1968) pointed
out, is not a distinct and isolated phenomenon.
Rather, it is an identified quality that in fact bleeds
into other colors, and upon focus, might be seen
as pores, blood vessels, or other aspects of the
flesh, in ever receding fashion. It is an identifiable
phenomenon, but that phenomenon is part of an
ongoing, branching continuum. Making a connection
between flesh and vision, Merleau-Ponty argued
it is similar when one gazes upon the world. The
world is not contained within the seer, and the seer
is not contained within the world. Rather, “There is
reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the
other” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 138). Further, like
seeing the red beneath the eye, or the fading of the
color, or the pores, or the blood vessels, the subject
and object meet each other at different points.
Merleau-Ponty eschewed the metaphors of levels
and planes where these points meet, but instead
referred to them as concentric circles, spheres, or
vortexes. That is, subject and object meet in a sphere
of being, from overlapping spheres of perspective.
This sphere of being is the ontological moment.
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A further exploration of these points in relation to
the phenomenon of de qi in traditional Chinese
medicine is explored in the Discussion.
While Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ontology
as chiasm offers some appeal for understanding
psychological energy, as an ontological model, it
suffers from an unsatisfying circularity. That is, one
might accept that the essence of knowing, or the
known moment of being is a reciprocal, branching
meeting self and the world. However, it does not
explain what makes this meeting possible. It simply
says that any inquiry will take one along this meeting,
branching path. This limitation is somewhat mitigated
when one considers that Merleau-Ponty (1968)
was building off his previous work (Merleau-Ponty,
2012/1945), in which he described in detail that
the flesh is the process of being. In his later work,
Merleau-Ponty (1968) extended the concept of flesh
to both vision and the world. When vision encounters
the world, the vision is flesh, and the flesh of vision
(as well as the touch) meets the flesh of the world.
In this sense, both the body and all its perceptive
faculties, and the world that it meets and that meets
it in return, are flesh in Merleau-Ponty’s previously
established sense of the term. Nonetheless, it is still
tempting to inquire what ontological principles, if any,
such as Whitehead’s God or Bhaskar’s intransitive
dimension of nature, might make such a phenomenal
world possible to begin with.
Ferrer: An Ontology of Participatory Events
Participatory thought—drawn from Romantic
philosophers such as Goethe, developed by Tarnas
(1991), with numerous parallels to Gendlin’s (2018)
process model, and influences from Merleau-Ponty
(2012/1945)—has been applied to the domain of
religious studies and transpersonal psychology by
Jorge N. Ferrer (2002, 2017). Ferrer’s participatory
theory, with developments by Hartelius (2019;
Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013), offers a context in which
an “open naturalism” (Ferrer, 2014; cf. Stroud, 2004)
can be used flexibly with a plurality of ontologies for
rigorous study of phenomena, such as psychological
energy, that sit at the uneasy interface of psychology
and spirituality—and it can do so without appeal
to either metaphysics or classical physicalist
assumptions common in Western empiricism
(Ferrer, 2002; Hartelius, 2019).
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For Ferrer (2002, 2017), people, objects,
places, and any other locations within reality
represent intersections of infinitely interrelating
subjects. This web of interrelating subjects has
some parity with Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm, but it
takes into account the branching intersection of all
subjects at once. In Ferrer’s conception, there is not
one human subject who meets an outside “world,”
as Merleau-Ponty described, but rather the world
is itself an intersubjective web, as is the human
subject who meets it. Because there are no objects
that are not also subjects or subjects that are not
also objects, the notion of objectivity—a knowable
world “out there”—is useful but fictive (Hartelius,
2019; cf. Rorty, 1979); subjects and objects become
subject-objects.
From a participatory perspective, ontology
is pluralistic in two respects. First, the primary
ontological context of interest in participatory
theory is the intersection between subject-objects
and the creative generativity out of which these
subject-objects and their relational intersections
are continuously emerging; Ferrer (2017) called
this creative potential “the Mystery.” This account
results not in one hierarchical ontological schema,
but an infinitely diverse universe of events in which
subject-object participants meet in relational
engagement. Second, because all subject-objects
in the universe are considered to be engaged in
a participatory, co-creative process, metaphysical
and spiritual ontologies—“spiritual ultimates,” such
as God or Brahman, or afterlives, such as heaven
or the underworld—are considered to be “real” (at
least functionally, if not actually or ontologically)
within the context of the culture where they
reside (Ferrer, 2002, 2017). In terms of ontologies
of ultimate concern, participatory theory presents
what might be termed an optimistic agnosticism:
It sees the proliferation of cultures, philosophies,
and spiritual traditions as evidence of a reality
that is always creatively emerging, not from a
singular, metaphysical ultimate, but out of relational
engagements among and with its participants, as
well as the Mystery—the unfathomable fecundity—
of existence. Despite its unknown qualities, this
ongoing process of relational engagement is
regarded as irrepressible rather than indeterminate;
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thus, it envelops encounters traditionally regarded as
metaphysical—including transpersonal experiences
and other difficult-to-explain phenomena—into its
participatory framework. The variety of ultimate
ontologies reflects actual differences in qualities of
relationship and diversities in locatedness of being
within the relational matrices of the world (Hartelius
& Ferrer, 2013).
Because locatedness is necessarily diverse
and differentiated, like coordinates on an everevolving map, navigating multiple ontologies is a
necessity of everyday life, not to mention the formal
epistemological enterprise of research. A devout
Muslim family may live in a Latin American Catholic
culture with a daughter who works as a secular
modernist scientist and who is married to a woman of
Afro-Caribbean spirituality who practices Buddhist
meditation. In daily life, these complexities are often
navigated informally through compartmentalization,
syncretism, construction of novel ontologies, or
creative compromise. In the domain of scholarship,
participatory thought calls for a direct, conscientious
engagement among such diverse ontologies. While
a participatory approach requires engagement and
negotiation among ontologies, it does not prescribe
how to conduct this negotiation; each situation is
different. If there is to be research into psychological
energy, participatory theory might suggest that
various intersecting ontological frameworks require
dialog among classical physicalism, existentialism,
and metaphysical foundationalism. In particular,
psychological science is challenged to engage in this
active negotiation.
In a participatory approach, such a
negotiation is not a valueless, postmodern morass;
ontologies can be weighted and contextualized
based on the context or sphere of interest, and they
may not be mutually exclusive. In practice, this
weighted contextualization bears some similarity
to Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) intertwining spheres
of experience and Bhaskar’s (Bhaskar et al., 2017)
matching epistemologies to ontological contexts
of interest. From a participatory perspective, the
primary ontological context of interest in the study
of psychological energy is a participatory event in
which the phenomenon referred to as psychological
energy occurs. This participatory event is a meeting
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of a complex web of subject-objects in which
are embedded a possible plurality of intersecting,
overlapping, and enmeshed ontological frameworks.
A researcher wanting to understand the rich
moment of a psychological energy event must
engage these intersecting ontological frameworks
in dialog. Existentialists recognize the ineffability
of the phenomenon and the experiential limits of
their reality; classical physicalists recognize that a
phenomenon must have qualities that are apparent
to multiple observers; metaphysical foundationalists
allow that the objective qualities of the phenomenon
may not fall within the limits of the observational
faculties of the natural sciences, including the
human senses and scientific instrumentation. It
would be ideal to adhere to the requirements of
all of these intersecting ontologies simultaneously
(Banerji, 2018; Hartelius et al., 2017), but it may
be more pragmatic to negotiate the conflicting
assumptions that are crucial to the integrity of their
associated epistemologies for research purposes
(Hartelius, 2019). Within scientific psychology,
this might mean the empirical study of research
questions that arise from experiential reports but do
not conform a priori to the reality assumptions of
the discipline of physics. Existential ontologies might
need to engage in empirical inquiry as a sort of
formal dialogue with the world that may lead to new
and better knowledge, rather than as a violation of
the sacredness of the phenomenon. Metaphysical
foundationalist ontologies might be called to bracket
metaphysical assumptions and hermeneutical
interpretations with a humility characterized by an
openness to new evidence and novel perspectives,
perhaps in line with the classic Zen Buddhist adage,
The finger pointing at the moon is not the moon.
Participatory theory is influenced by
existentialist ontologies, resting on the assumption
that human experience is a grounding principle of
reality. However, by extending existentialist ontology
to all subjects at once rather than focusing on one
intrasubjective experience at a time, participatory
theory aspires to a more universal scope, attempting
to include phenomena traditionally regarded as
subjective, objective, and metaphysical as part of
its web of intersubject-interobject locations. For
metaphysical foundationalists, this does not resolve
Da & Hartelius

the question of whether there is some essential
entity that makes these intersubject-interobject
locations possible in the first place—an ultimate
categorical nature of reality that underlies the
plurality and diversity emphasized by participatory
theory. For existentialists, an argument grounded in
intersubjectivity extends beyond the scope of what
it is possible for an individual human to existentially
know, and thus for the existentialists, participatory
theory shares the speculativeness of metaphysical
foundationalism that the existentialists attempt to
avoid. Successfully or not, participatory theory
attempts to embrace these conflicting perspectives
by placing the relationships among them—including
the relationship between these perspectives and its
own—at the center of its ontology.
Discussion
his paper considers psychological energy
in light of post-20th-century metaphysical
foundationalist and existentialist ontologies that
either challenge or expand upon the ontological
assumptions that underly conventional Western
empiricism. All of theories discussed herein ponder
a point beyond which human knowing fails and
wonders. Metaphysical foundationalism attempts to
fill in the unknown with defined, but open-ended,
characteristics; existentialist ontologies emphasize
an ongoing process of relationship, curiosity, and
even wonder at the essential aspects of being,
arguing that the unknowable will remain so, but the
way humans relate to it determines the knowledge
that is gained from the investigation.
This difference is a matter of emphasis and
degree. Metaphysical foundationalism generally
views existentialist ontology as incomplete, rather
than incorrect. With its nested ontology, critical
realism might frame the difference as follows:
Existentialist ontology gazes from the perspective of
the “empirical” domain to understand the “actual,”
and acknowledge the existence of the “real;”
metaphysical foundationalism ultimately aims to
understand the “real,” and in turn how that shapes
the “actual” and “empirical.” The existentialists
might counter that the metaphysical foundationalists
attempt to ascribe characteristics to the nature of the
universe that are too far outside of human experience
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to ever be able to know; what can be known is how
humans engage with the nature of the world and
how that engagement is interpreted and described.
Participatory theory, though weighted toward an
existentialist perspective, attempts to place these
perspectives into dialog.
De Qi: A Working Example
The phenomenon of de qi in traditional
Chinese medicine is a useful example for comparing
the fitness of the ontological approaches discussed
in this paper to the understanding of psychological
energy. Often translated as “the arrival of vital
energy [qi],” “needling sensation,” or “needling
response” (Yang et al., 2013, p. 1), de qi is a sensation
at an acupuncture point that can be experienced by
the acupuncture patient, the practitioner, or both.
De qi can include a wide range of sensations, but
common sensations among patients include aching,
soreness, numbness, tingling, heaviness, distension,
or pressure (Park et al., 2013). For clinicians, the
experience of de qi is different, relating more to
the resistance and grasp of the acupuncture needle;
many practitioners regard their experiences of de qi
to be as important as the patients’ (Yang et al., 2013).
Some research has attempted to determine the
biomechanisms of de qi from a Western anatomical
perspective (Yang et al., 2013), but these results are
regarded as emergent (Park et al., 2013). Whatever
the mechanisms, de qi has been regarded as
essential for positive outcomes in traditional Chinese
medicine since the Neijing, earliest known historical
text (Kong et al., 2007). Today a tension exists in
the literature between traditional explanations
of the mechanisms at work in traditional Chinese
medicine and Western biophysical explanations
that mirrors the scientific critiques of energy in
psychology. In short, critics with a conventional
(Humian), Western empiricist orientation argue that
traditional explanations are metaphorical and naïve
(e.g., Robinson, 2009), and traditionalists argue that
clinically relevant information is lost by reducing the
rich experiences of clinicians and patients to maps
of neural pathways (cf., Park et al., 2013), which is
typical of the occulocentricsm in Western scientific
culture (Levin, 1993; Hartelius, 2007).
These opposing positions on de qi reflect
some of the modern tensions in the literature regarding
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psychological energy: Should psychological energy
be studied merely as a biological phenomenon
according to the Western anatomical model? Should
the experience be emphasized over anatomical
mechanisms? Should the patient’s or therapist’s
experience of psychological energy be given greater
weight? Research on the phenomenon traditionally
referred to as psychological energy from a Western
anatomical perspective is already in progress
and has yielded useful results (e.g., Levine, 2012;
Porges, 2001), but it may leave out a richness or
truth of the phenomenon. The question herein
is how researchers might ontologically orient to
psychological energy so it can be better understood
on its own terms.
Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) conception of the
chiasm of flesh seems an excellent fit with the
phenomenon of de qi. The practitioner’s experience
and the patient’s experience both meet and
differentiate along the length of the acupuncture
needle, or at the flesh when the acupuncturist
touches the patient with a finger or thumb. This
meeting is reciprocal—both patient and practitioner
have meeting and intertwining experiences—but
the patient’s and practitioner’s experiences are not
interchangeable. Further, one can zoom in and out
on the experience from many perspectives, from
both the patient’s and the practitioner’s point of
view. These perspectives might include the somatic
(felt sense), descriptive, metaphorical, mechanical,
electromagnetic (skin conductivity), or various
aspects of the biological, such as patterns of blood
flow or activation within the nervous system. With
the mediation of the needle, one can see that the
practitioner’s and patient’s experiences do not meet
and intertwine on a line or plane, but rather in a
space that is shaped more like overlapping spherical
zones or vortexes. Further, at each point of overlap
where these spheres of experience meet—somatic,
neurological, and so on—there is infinitely branching
detail, and each branch extends into the next possible
sphere of experience. There is not one correct
answer regarding what sphere is the most relevant
to observe the phenomenon because its observable
qualities progress and recede in dendritic fashion. A
participatory approach (Ferrer, 2002) to studying de
qi would largely align with Merleau-Ponty’s, except
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that it might also add that phenomena occurring
between practitioner and client are co-creative and
relational, rather than individually subjective.
Bhaskar’s critical realism would view de
qi as a laminated phenomenon that could be
viewed through many lenses, corresponding to
a multiplicity of ontological layers (Bhaskar et al.,
2017). As with Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm, one could
look at the phenomenon from the perspectives the
felt sense, phenomenal descriptions, neurology,
and so on. In alignment with critical realism, one
could also examine the phenomenon using the
tools of social constructionism in order to critique
cultural biases embedded in the conclusions drawn
from observation. Critical realism encourages
the incorporation of formalized multidisciplinary
research to understand such phenomena. However,
following Bhaskar et al.’s multidisciplinary research
method, researchers may suffer from foreclosing
on understanding before full engagement can
be reached because this method recommends
researchers construct an ontological hierarchy
before research begins. Herein it is argued that such
a foreclosure in the early stages of research runs the
risk of missing important information that may help
to elucidate a poorly understood phenomenon of
interest, such as de qi or psychological energy.
Existential engagement, and subsequent
hermeneutical interpretation, is the focus
of Heidegger’s (1999/1927) ontology and
epistemology. It is unknown, but one could imagine
that leading up to the time of the Neijing (Ni, 1995),
traditional Chinese medicine practitioners may
have done exactly this: They may have allowed the
phenomenon to be disclosed existentially and then
hermeneutically described their experiences. With
renewed questions regarding its nature, modern
researchers might re-engage with a similar process
and put any new hermeneutical descriptions that
may emerge from that engagement in dialog with
the existing ones. A similar process has been at
work in the history of psychology with regards to
psychological energy. Jung (2014/1969) and Reich
(1968/1942) challenged Freud’s (2012a/1920,
2012b/1899, 2012c/1922) theory of libido, Lowen
(1979/1958) challenged Reich, and so on. Continued,
renewed engagement with the phenomenon
Da & Hartelius

of psychological energy yields progress in its
understanding. Such an existential engagement with
an eye toward developing better research methods
might yield progress along those lines.
One could apply Wilber’s (2000) model
to the phenomenon of de qi by recognizing
that understanding and engagement of the
phenomenon are state-based in a way that
aligns to the phenomenon’s situation within an
ontologically hierarchy. A trained acupuncturist
can diagnostically attune to the qualities of de qi,
but a novice practitioner cannot. Gendlin’s (1978,
2018) contribution to research might be similar to
Wilber’s; Gendlin argued that the self is constructed
hierarchically in space and time. This position
might help researchers understand how to orient
within themselves in order to observe psychological
energy. For example, attending to the felt sense, in
Gendlin’s terms, might put researchers in a better
position to recognize felt sense experiences in
research participants.
Of all of these ontological models,
Whitehead’s (2010/1929) may have the least
research value with regard to de qi or psychological
energy. There is no inherent contradiction between
the phenomenon of de qi and Whitehead’s
ontology. What Whitehead might add to the debate
between the traditionalists and the conventional
Western biophysical researchers is that de qi is an
actual occasion that can be an infinitely complex
combination of actual entities infused with eternal
objects, and actual entities can include mental
events. Therefore, it is best to take an inclusive stance
when evaluating the actuality of a phenomenon.
However, knowing (or believing) that de qi is a
complex entity infused with eternal objects would
seem to add little to the research.
Ontology and Research
on Psychological Energy
Heidegger’s (1999/1927), Merleau-Ponty’s
(1968, 2012/1945), and Bhaskar’s (1997/1975;
Bhaskar et al., 2017) ontological perspectives seem
the most productive foundations for research on
psychological energy, and Ferrer’s (2002, 2017)
participatory theory could help bridge differences
among these approaches. A critical first step aligns
with Heidegger’s emphasis on being existentially
Ontologies for Research on Psychological Energy

inside a phenomenon (readiness-to-hand, or
Zuhandenheit) in order to best understand it.
To achieve this, a researcher might undergo
professional psychotherapeutic training that
includes interventions that focus on psychological
energy as a mechanism or explanatory framework.
Hypothetically, this would give the researcher a
chance to gain an insider’s perspective into the
phenomenon—or meet it in the “flesh,” in MerleauPonty’s language. Such training might also address
Wilber’s (2000) argument that the ability to achieve a
state of consciousness is necessary to understand an
associated nonordinary or transpersonal experience.
Because researchers who have had psi experiences
themselves tend to find more positive results in psi
research (Schlitz et al., 2006; Smith, 2003), it seems
reasonable to infer that this might also hold true for
psychological energy.
Neurophenomenology (Varela, 1996), which
combining neuroimaging with phenomenological
experiential reports, is an example of such a
layered, or laminated research technique along the
lines of Bhaskar et al. (2017) . Merleau-Ponty (1968)
would likely suggest a more fluid and bidirectional
approach, with a focus on the phenomenological
perspectives of both the client and therapist. If
neuroimaging were conducted, it might best be
conducted through EEG imaging performed on
both the client and therapist simultaneously in a
live psychotherapy session (cf. Kenreich et al., 2017;
Kleinbub et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2018; Messina et al.,
2012). The methodology of somatic phenomenology
(Hartelius, 2020, 2022) might also be useful in
capturing information about sensations that occur
in and around the body, including descriptions of
quality, size, location, shape, direction, and motion
in relation to the body, from both the client’s and
the therapist’s perspectives. Participatory theory
(Ferrer, 2002) adds the caution that the phenomena
of interest are not separate and passive; researchers
are relationally engaged in a world in which they are
also participants. For example, participatory theory
might encourage greater attention to experimenter
effects when attempting to replicate an experiment.
There is, of course, a question of practicality.
The bar for gaining psychotherapeutic training
is high, the research requires mixed methods,
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and funding for such an exploratory study on
psychological energy would likely be difficult in the
current environment. With this in mind, the best
candidates for conducting such research are likely
to be graduate students, particularly those with
access to a clinical practice working on doctoral
research. Graduate students are often in their early
careers or in career transitions, and they may be
open to or actively receiving clinical training. They
are also generally required to conduct in-depth
research projects without funding. If there is a path
forward for researching psychological energy that
goes beyond standalone neuroimaging studies or
standalone phenomenological studies, doctoral
students may be the most likely candidates to
conduct it. It is hoped that this paper will serve as
at least one possible trailhead for that path toward
future research.
Conclusion
heories of psychological energy have a rich
history. Current trends in research focus primarily
on neurological correlates to psychological energy.
While this research is valuable, some richness of
the phenomenon may be lost. This paper argued
that the hierarchies elucidated within metaphysical
foundationalist
ontologies
are
useful
for
understanding that there are layers or levels within
being, and that a specific research method might
be selected to engage with a specific layer or level.
In contrast, or complement, existentialist ontologies
emphasize a stance that is open to the richness
of human engagement with being. While the
existentialist ontologies also recognize hierarchical
levels of being, these ontologies emphasize textures,
contours, and limitations for these levels that
reflect human experience. Selecting methods that
emphasize such an existential ontological stance
might better allow researchers to remain open
to the disclosure of psychological energy before
moving forward with an experimental design that
might miss important qualities. Doctoral students
with training in interventions that emphasize
psychological energy might be suitable candidates
to conduct such research, and it is hoped that
this paper might serve as a starting point for its
theoretical foundations.
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